This paper discusses the current issues and proposes legal remedies for removing the barriers to gathering cross-border electronic evidence in crime investigation. Crime and cyber-crime have a huge influence on our modern economy as the yearly damage is estimated to cost hundreds of billions of USD. Efficient fight against cybercrime in the interconnected society faces several barriers due to the inconsistent understanding in cross-border eevidence search, the legality of the data sought, and the rules for cooperation with the service providers of communication services. The paper evaluates the current legal scene and the existing regulative enabling collection of cross-border electronic evidence. The attitudes and the views towards the current legal instruments enabling efficient cybercrime and crime investigation and crossborder e-evidence collection among the legal practitioners are analysed based on empirical data collected with two surveys. Answers to the research questions 'if the barriers for cross-border access to e-evidence can be removed with new regulation' are provided by analysing both the survey results and the new EU regulation for investigation, production and preservation orders.
Introduction
The interconnectivity of the global society enables criminals to operate across different jurisdictions, with elements connected to their crimes spread widely across the globe in both time and space. 1 More and more criminals use computing devices such as mobile phones or PCs to commit a diverse range of criminal activities online. As the nature of these devices allows that traces associated with crime are left behind, electronic forms of evidence for judicial proceedings are increasingly important and are in demand today. Digital devices store, transmit or process a wealth of user data that is integrated with email accounts, cloud-based services, social networking platforms, and synchronized desktop applications. The electronic data can contain detailed sequences of events indicative of criminal intent, interrelationships between organized networks of offenders, and information about the places of suspects of criminal activity. 2 A large quantity of electronic traces is gathered by various service providers, such as telecommunication services, information society services, and cloud services providers and they serve as important evidence in crime investigation. Compelling service providers to disclose these data requested by law enforcement bodies by means of production and preservation orders has recently become a significant building block that empowers the criminal investigations. 3 Information and communication technology (ICT) is simultaneously the subject (place), the tool (instrument) and the object (target) of crime. 4 The available information-communication technology (ICT) and its technical devices facilitate traditional crimes, such as offences against property and offences causing personal harm, 5 but the use of technology in committing cybercrime is much more difficult to address within the existing national legal frameworks, 6 despite the common understanding that crime in the interconnected world is transnational in terms of the physical location of victims, criminal actors and the e-evidence. The problem is compounded by the facts that traditional mutual legal assistance regimes are not designed for the computer age, with procedures often being too slow and too laborious to facilitate the effective cross-border collection of electronic evidence. 7 In the situation where direct interaction with online service providers is allowed by the country legislation and the legislation of the country where the provider is incorporated, practitioners are faced often with unpredictable cooperation from the owner of the stored data. Furthermore, the required technical knowledge for understanding the ever-changing digital technology and the data nature contributes to the frustration and inefficiency of the involved investigators.
Another challenge with collecting e-evidence is that the investigators must ensure that they abide by applicable laws or otherwise risk that the seized exhibits will be declared inadmissible at trial. Sometimes, there are exceptions that may justify warrantless search and seizure activities as was pointed by Dee. 8 During warrant activities, investigators may also discover legally protected sources of electronically stored information, adding a layer of complexity to the process of evidence handling. 9 Another problem with the e-evidence is connected to the preservation of stored data as in EU data retention remains controversial due to the declaration of the EU Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC) as invalid due to a violation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 10 Currently, important work, aimed at creating a workable legal framework for law enforcement access to electronic data, is carried out on several fronts and has started to bear results in removing the existing barriers. In this paper, an analytical overview is provided of the most important current and forthcoming frameworks focused to the issue of law enforcement cross-border access to evidence, namely the Council of Europe's Cybercrime Convention (CCC), the European Investigation Order (EIO), and the EU's proposed e-evidence Regulation. The paper as well analyses the data collected from two surveys among the European legal practitioners aimed to identify the main obstacles for effective use of the European investigation order and about the kind of skills expected to be part of the practitioner's competence participating in a crime investigation process where e-evidence is sought abroad. Most important aspects of the new initiative that will allow the European law enforcements to obtain relevant data abroad are elaborated with some added critical marks. Finally, based on the analyses of the current international instruments for obtaining e-evidence in crime investigation, the collected survey data and the new proposed regulation an answer to the research question 'if the barriers for cross-border access to e-evidence can be removed with new EU regulation' is provided with some comments. The research method used in the paper is inspired with the study method applied to the current legal instruments and the collected empirical data during the survey. The analysis of the new regulation is used to find answers to the research question: will the existing barriers for cross-board e-evidence access in the current legal framework be removed in an attempt to make cybercrime investigations more successful?
The paper is organized as follows: the next section provides a brief description of the current legal scene; the third section discusses the results of the survey carried out among the European legal practitioners. The last two sections of the paper focus on the major elements of the new proposed initiative. The concluding marks provide brief assessments about the main changes and introduced novelties prepared to remove some of the barriers for collecting cross-border e-evidence in the interconnected world and leading to more efficient justice processing of criminal acts.
The current legal scene and cross-border search for e-evidence

Budapest cyber-crime convention
The best-known juridical act in the fight against cybercrime within the interconnected society with an international dimension is the Council of Europe's Convention on Cybercrime. 11 The document is a result of the efforts dedicated to solving the problems of cyber-based crime by the members of the Council of Europe (CoE), Interpol, Europol, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the G8 Group of States, the Commonwealth and the United Nations (UN). The document of the Council of Europe also known as Budapest Cybercrime Convention (hereinafter referred to as the CCC) entered into force in July 2004. It should be noted that the CCC is not limited to matters of cybercrime only as it embraces also investigatory measures concerning 'the collection of evidence in electronic form' for any form of offence where such electronic evidence may be relevant. 12 The CCC with its 64 contracting states constitutes the first and most significant multilateral binding instrument to regulate cybercrime.
In order to be implemented CCC requires adoption of an MLA (Mutual Legal Assistance) agreement between the signatories. This flexibility of CCC has ensured that 17 years after its establishment, the Convention is still relevant and has an enduring influence in over 130 11 Council of Europe, 'Convention on Cybercrime' (European Treaty Series -No. 185, 2001 ). 12 P de Hert, C Parlar and J Sajfert (n 3) 328. countries. However, during the years of implementation it became that some instruments within the CCC, for example, the production order and data specified as subscriber and traffic data, need further explanation for an effective use of article 18. 13 This article is ordering ('shall') to the signatories to design their domestic legislative framework, in a more granular manner as to data definition and categorization. Another issue that needed a new solution was the lack of common definition of the type of data and the flexibility of the rules in the signatory legislations due to the fact that definitions appeared to not be the same. The CCC positively determines the traffic data, while the scope of subscriber information is defined through a negative relation ('other than traffic or content data'). Same approach is used for content data as CCC refers to them with negative relation ('other than traffic data'). 14 Remedy for overcoming the differences in data understanding was provided in March 2017 by the Cybercrime Convention Committee (hereinafter T-CY) of CoE, in the form of a Guidance Note that focused on the interpretation of Article 18 addressing the interpretation of the 'Production orders for subscriber information' (hereinafter in the Guidance Note). Soon after the adoption of the Guidance Note, criticism about the interpretation of the article (18) (1) (b) of the CCC in the Guidance Note appeared by several legal experts. 15 Additional misunderstanding was found in the definition of the service provider which is specified as '(a) any public or private entity that provides to users of its service the ability to communicate using a computer system and (ii) any other entity that processes or stores computer data on behalf of such communication service or users of such service.'
The interpretation of Article 18 (1) of the CCC in the Guidance Note allows the issuance of production orders by law enforcement bodies to foreign established service providers or persons to be without specification whether the required subscriber information is stored within or outside the ordering state's territory. Other authors 16 also found that the interpretation is insufficient and misleading in legal context as the Article 18 (1) (a) CCC is interpreted as an additional legal basis for production orders by enabling a search through a whole spectrum of data including subscriber information, traffic and content data stored abroad by a provider that is at the same time physically present within the ordering state's territory. Guidance Note with the existing interpretation of article 18 (1) is also misleading regarding the way the data should be sought. The agreement by the cooperating states about the ordering document defined in the CCC does not allow to be classified as consent to the extraterritorial enforcement of domestic production orders. The ordering statement can be true only in cases when it addresses foreign-based service providers storing data in a foreign territory as this action is not considered to be an exercise of state power in the territory of another state. Otherwise, such a production order would require a permissive rule derived from international custom or convention in order to not conflict with international law. The extension of the scope of Article 18 (1) of the CCC 13 CCC Article 18 instructs the signatories to adopt legislative measures for empowering the competent authorities to prepare production order, the powers and procedures referred in article 18 are specified in article 14 and article 15 where they are instructed to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to empower its competent authorities in order: a person in its territory to submit specified computer data in that person or a service provider offering its services in the territory of the Party to submit subscriber information relating to such services in that service provider's possession or control. in the proposed way by the Guidance Note represents also a challenge to the principle of territoriality and sovereignty, which are essentially interconnected with the protection of fundamental rights and the rule of law. 17 This issue is addressed with the following statement from the Note: 'the parties to the convention are expected to form a community of trust that respects Article 15 CCC'. 18 As the subscriber information actually stands for, this missing exact subscriber information is of tremendous importance to the evaluation of the impact the privacy has on production orders issued according to Article 18 (1) (b) of CCC. Another gap in the Guidance Note is the neglected provision of information about the dynamic IP address used by the person`s device and whether this data can be considered as subscriber information, or does it fall into the category of traffic data and is consequently outside the scope of Article 18 (1) of the CCC. The lack of a consistent definition usually results in conflicts of law as regards the scope of the envisaged measures and to misunderstandings between the requesting authority in the other country and the executing authority or the service provider addressed. 19 In addition, the EIOD replaced the Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA on the European Evidence Warrant to obtain objects, documents and data to be used in proceedings in criminal matters and it also replaces those provisions of the Framework decision 2003/577/JHA regarding the freezing of evidence (the recitals 25 and 26 of the European Directive for Investigation Order -EIOD). 21 The EIOD was 17 M Hildebrandt, 'Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Enforce in Cyberspace? Bodin, Schmitt, Grotius in Cyber-space' (2013) 63 UTLJ 196. 18 Article 15 requires that the powers and procedures in requesting data are subject to conditions and safeguards provided under its domestic law, which shall provide adequate protection of human rights. Article 20 in addition requires personal data to be protected in cases of automatic processing in accordance with the Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA; Cybercrime Convention Committee, 'T-CY Guidance Note #10 Production orders for subscriber information (Article 18 Budapest Convention)' (2017), https://rm.coe.int/16806f943e accessed 9 December 2019. developed with an aim to overcome the complexity and fragmentation, which the current system of mutual legal assistance in crime investigation represents. This was done by replacing the existing different rules and systems for obtaining all kinds of evidence with one single instrumentby adoption the EIOD (Directive, para (7)). 22 For this purpose, number of investigative measures are detailed in Articles 22-31 of the EIO Directive. 23 Apart from the interception of telecommunications which may include internet-based communications based on the discovered IP address of the suspect, the assistance of the other judicial authority to access electronic evidence is based on a judicial decision which has been issued or validated by a judicial authority of a Member State ('the issuing state') to have one or several specific investigative measure(s) carried out in another member state ('the executing state') in order to obtain evidence in accordance with this Directive'.
Directive 2014/41/EU and the European investigation order
Regarding the authorities capable of issuing and validating an investigation order based on the EIO instrument (Article 2(2)), 24 the EIO directive specifies details on the meaning and the scope of the term 'judicial authority'. These are listed as authorized entities, like judges, courts, investigation judges, and public prosecutors competent in the crime case concerned. While based on the principle of mutual recognition, the EIO also incorporates the existing flexibility of the traditional system of MLAT known from the Cyber Crime Convention (Recital 6 of the EIOD) by allowing the executing states to enjoy some margin of manoeuvre when receiving a request via an EIO (European Investigation Order). 25 The EIOD defines the deadlines for the executing authority to decide on the recognition or execution of an EIO and as well as the time limit to carry out the investigation measure related to evidence collection (90 days). By criminal proceedings, the EIOD refers to those that are initiated by judicial and administrative authorities of particular member state where the investigation started.
However, one of the gaps identified in the EIOD is the lack of the specific provisions addressing the collection of electronic evidence. EIOD does not specify and categorize the different types of electronic data that are needed in modern investigations of crime and are present on the communication infrastructures of the interconnected world of 21 century. This is not to say the EIO cannot or should not be used for such measures. Rather, the description of the investigative measure requesting cross-border electronic evidence requires this to be manually entered into a free text field of the predefined EIOD formthe specified template. Given the variations of data specification and understanding regarding identities, content and traffic data to be found in the electronic 22 The single instrument called European investigation order establishes a single regime for obtaining evidence, with only one notable exception of cross-border surveillance and establishment of Joint investigation teams. 23 Articles 22-29 provide the specifications of specific investigative measures, like transfer of persons to custody, or transfer to the executing state a person held in custody, the use of hearing by videoconference or by telephone conference, information on banks and other financial accounts, information on banking and financial operators, gathering evidences in real time and continuously. Article 29 specifies the procedures for covert investigation and Articles 30-31 specifies the interception of telecommunications with assistance of another Member State. 24 Article (2) defines the issuing and the executing state. The issuing authority is a judge, a court, an investigating judge or a public prosecutor. Article 2 (2) extends the issuing authority to any other competent authority as defined by the issuing state, however, it should be validated with conditions for issuing an EIO under the EIOD. 25 Recital 6 specifies that the setting up of a comprehensive system for obtaining evidence in case with cross-border dimension on the principal of mutual recognition should be further pursued.
communication infrastructure across juridical sectors involved in crime investigation as well as the differences in Member states legal frameworks regarding electronic data categorization residing on the communication networks, the selection of the right wording to describe investigative measures addressing e-evidence is a big challenge in the predefined EIOD template. Recognizing this problem as well as usually delayed answers or no answers received at all from the service providers acting in EU, the European Commission started to work on developing an 'electronic user-friendly' regulation and user supporting documents known as 'Regulation on production and preservation order' in the text that follows called 'Regulation'. 26 Although the process of adoption of the Regulation by the European Parliament is still ongoing at the time of writing, it can be expected that the data specification based on the categorization that takes care about the data owner privacy, new definitions and explanation will be implemented soon as the exact concept of data specification is extremely relevant for implementation of Article 32 of EIOD 27 that addresses the provisional measures for issuing investigation orders. 28 Article 32 of the Directive recognizes the time-sensitive nature of preservation of (electronic) evidence important for their delivery as it introduces a shortened timeframe for the executing authority to communicate its decision on the request (24 h) issued by another country authority. This is quite an advancement when compared to the regular requests of 30 days (Directive, article 12 (3)). On a closer look, however, Article 32 of the EIO Directive does not affect the time limits for actual execution of a request for provisional measures defined in Article 32, because the time limit of 90 days delivery that is set for standard requests for evidence also applies in cases when electronic evidence is searched (Directive, article 12 (3)(4)). 29 Such time limit without request for preservation would contribute the electronic evidence to disappear from the communication infrastructure. Anyhow, it should be stressed that successful gathering of e-evidence depends mainly on the close cooperation with the service providers meaning that enabling direct contacts and communication is essential.
Direct cooperation with service providers
National criminal courts in Europe are not strictly bound to the definitions offered in the EU directives. So, the cooperation between court entities is left to the legal system applied in a particular country and the service providers. The EU Member States have different approaches when telecommunication service provider established in another country are requested they to comply with the request issued by their own national authorities. The situation is the following: For investigative measures, the Directive replaces corresponding provisions in a number of international instruments (i.e. EIOD, art 34). Since EIOD is not limited to the investigative measures detailed in articles 22 to 31, and given the main objective EIO to be primary instrument for legal assistance between participating member State the EIOD brings in Article 32 additional provisional measures. These have to be used for prevention of the destruction, transformation, removal, transfer or disposal of an item that may be used as evidence. This makes the gathering of electronic evidence more practical. 28 C Warken, L van Zwietem and D Svantesson (n 7). 29 Article 12 (3) specifies that the executing authority shall take decision on the recognition or execution of the EIO not later than 30 days after the receipt of the EIO. Article 12(4) specifies that the unless grounds for postponement exist, the executing authority shall carry out investigative measure without delay and without prejudice, not later than 90 days.
. Voluntary cooperation exists in: Austria, Romania, Sweden, Hungary, Netherlands, Greece, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Slovenia, Italy, Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, Bulgaria. . Mandatory in: Belgium, Cyprus, Spain, Portugal, United Kingdom, France, Lithuania.
When data is requested under an EIO or the MLAT's instruments, the communication is carried out between two public authorities, while in the case of direct cooperation with foreign service providers the dialogue is between a public and a private entity. As a result, the private parties' obligations concerning answers and deadlines as the form of execution or confidentiality differ. It is also worth noting that a great number of Member States do not provide a legal basis for service providers established in their territory to respond to the direct requests of law enforcement bodies. To remedy the situation, the European Commission's recently proposed an appointment of legal representatives within the service providers acting in EU to be set for direct communication with the EU legal bodies in case of electronic data request. 30 The document prepared by the EU Commission offers a structured description of the service providers duties in the cases of legal-based criminal investigations. In that regard, the proposal defines a service provider as any natural or legal person that provides one or more categories of services which are defined as follows:
. Electronic communication services: the definition distinguishes between providers of three types of services: Internet access service, interpersonal communications service, services consisting wholly or mainly in the conveyance of signals, including telecommunications services such as transmission services in networks used for the provision of machine-to-machine services and broadcasting. . Providers of information society-services embrace 'any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means and at the individual request of a recipient of services', for which the storage of data is a defining component of the service provided to the user such as social networks, online marketplaces, cloud-based services and other hosting service providers (Article 2 (2)b of the Directive proposal). . Providers of names and numbering services for the internet such as IP addresses, domain name registries, domain name registrars and related privacy and proxy services.
These definitions are new and are in line with the changes that happened in the interconnected world of twenty-first century.
European legal practitioners and implementation in the existing legal instruments for cross-border e-evidence collection
The matter treated in the EIO Directive that appeared recently was new for legal practitioners and as a consequence it raised several questions related to its implementation in the national legal system. Critical questions were also raised regarding the procedure for issuing orders for e-evidence collection. In that context, a 2-year LIVE_FOR project (entitled Criminal Justice Access to Digital Evidences in the Cloud) from the EU JUST-2015-JCOO-AG program was launched to identify the state of the art relating to the pace of implementation of the Directive and to discover what kind problems or obstacles appeared while implementing the new legal instrument specified in the EIOD. One of the research aims of the project was focused on the status of the required skills for preparing a request for e-evidence gathering and how the methods for e-evidence collection are understood in practice. It was a common understanding of the project team that it is incumbent on the judges and other legal experts to have a comprehensive understanding of the type of collected material before they approach a criminal case. In that context, the aim of the project was also to find out whether the existing knowledge and understanding are sufficient for the effective use of EIOD in criminal cases and requesting e-evidence. It was common understanding that in the case that some obstacles are identified remedies should be suggested. Several instruments were used when implementing the project's objectives, among them were the joint meetings between the legal practitioners that were designed as a point where the participants could exchange knowledge and different opinions about the EIOD implementation. A next instrument was the organization of educational and training workshops with topics identified as being relevant and needed. Two joint meetings of the target community consisting of judges, public prosecutors, and investigative judges were organized in 2017; one in Brussels for the participants from the Western EU countries and the other one in Ljubljana focused more on the participants from Central Europe. Both joint meetings used a similar format for information exchange including keynote presentations, panels, and group discussions. In total, 53 participants from 18 countries attended the meetings, 26 participants were prosecutors, judges or investigators, 5 participants were policymakers, 7 participants were academics, and 15 participants were LIVE_FOR project partners and project advisory-board members. Three educational workshops followed with the topics related to the participants needs.
The general comments of the prosecutors and the judges during the meetings were positive as they welcomed EIOD. However, the usefulness of the EIOD in cybercrime cases that involved e-evidence was not strictly confirmed. Some of the participants found that the EIOD is useful because of its simplicity. The panels at the joint meetings stressed the need for effective (cross-border) remote e-evidence searches as well as for unilaterally preparations of the data requests to the foreign service providers and providers in the other Member State. In this context, a potential amendment to the EIOD was discussed regarding the unilateral interception of electronic communications according to Article 31 of the EIOD. Concealed measures (Article 29 of EIOD) were also elaborated and were identified as an EIOD problem due to the observed differences in the legal system and the interpretation of the type of electronic data in each of the EU Member State. 31 The participants pointed as well that the legal use of the e-evidence found abroad may be treated differently from state to state on the courts because the domestic legislation and definitions of the data differ. The invalidation of the Data Retention Directive was commented with mixed feelings as the time limits for data collection affects the collaboration of the collaborating parties and 31 Article 29 defines covert investigations. It allows the EIO to be issued for the purpose of requesting the executing State to assist the issuing State on the conduct of investigation into crime by officers acting under covert or false identity (covert investigation). the consideration of data privacy. Data encryption was also raised as a problem that prevents the understanding of the obtained data.
In addition to the meetings the project team prepared two on-line surveys with questionnaires addressing many aspects of EIOD and cross-board e-evidence collecting. 150 survey participants coming from 20 Member States participated in the survey. Among them 45.3% were public prosecutors, 29.3% were judges, 4.0% investigation judges, 4.0% representatives from ministries of justice, and the rest from law enforcement and other institutions. The surveys were anonymous, ensuring that the participants could share their honest opinions. However, for those interested, the survey form offered the possibility of sharing a contact address. The questionnaire was structured in four parts: Socio-demographics, Directive 2014/41/EU and European Investigation Order, Procedures, E-evidence and the Educational and Training needs. The questions were available in English, Slovenian, and Spanish. The online survey was available for completion from 11 April 2017 to 26 September 2017.
In analysing the results collected it became clear to the project team that there were judicial authorities in EU that leverage the technical subject matter when building a case, however, the need for continuing professional development by means of courses that directly address the impact of information technology upon the modes of criminal offences, with a focus on data for fraud, corruption, and data-driven acts causing personal harm was acknowledged and respective answers were obtained. The awareness of the digital forensics discipline and the characteristics of electronic evidence were also considered to be part of the required knowledge and skills for a better understanding and for employing the new instruments. Out of 108 survey participants who answered the question addressing the existence of EIOD, 66 answered that they have been acknowledged with the new Directive. The highest awareness rate about EIOD was found among the investigative judges and public prosecutors. A minority of the respondents (25.8%) expected to face obstacles in implementing the Directive. The obstacles mentioned in the answers included the parallel use of freezing orders, a lack of funding to prepare IT systems for the new requirements, a lack of training and legal advice on when and with which countries to use the EIOD instruments, especially in the context of an unclear definition of the suspect status, Brexit, resistance to changes, and judicial cooperation between countries that have already implemented the Directive and those that have not. More than half of the respondents (56%) answered that they will be engaged as an issuer or receiver in the process of cross-border collection of digital evidence and the use of EIO. The respondents that are involved in the investigation and require digital evidence to be collected outside their country reported that this is happening to them several times in a year, (40% from the whole set of involved in e-evidence collection), 13.9% are faced with this type of request weekly and 9.7% on a monthly basis. The participants also answered that in this type of criminal cases where e-evidence is needed they primarily face legal challenges, but also a lack of understanding of the type of evidence to be specified in EIO due to different systems, definitions and cultures. They also expressed the concern when dealing with a lack of knowledge in some technical areas connected to e-evidence collection. Some 46.3% of the whole set of participants indicated that their level of knowledge in the field of digital investigation is low while for 44.8% answered that it is close to medium; almost all (97%) felt that their current knowledge of digital investigation needs upgrading. Most of the respondents (68%) also pointed that they need additional training about the legal and technical issues related to collecting cross-border e-evidence. More than 40% of the respondents answered that in relation to the cross-border e-evidence issuing requests they usually ask for help from technical people or from a higher authority in their country. Summarizing these answers it appeared that one of the major difficulties in implementing the EIOD in cases where e-evidence is sought, was the lack of definition and categorization of the digital data that should be requested abroad. The differences in specifications and the missing common categorization were obvious. The details of the questionnaire including the questions, processed data, and details about the knowledge skills and competencies needed for a successful cross-border digital investigation and the EIO preparation can be found on the LIVE_FOR web page in Deliverable 2.1, 32 URL: http://www.live-for.eu/.
4. EU regulation on production and preservation ordersdo the new instruments remove the barriers for effective access to cross-border eevidence?
Introduction
The data from the surveys carried out within LIVE_FOR project clearly pointed out that collecting cross-border e-evidence with the EIOD instruments is not sufficient. The academic and legal practitioners community also reported that the possibilities for gathering crossborder evidence especially in case of cyberspace crime to be insufficient and inefficient. 33 The conclusion of these findings was that the European Commission should 'explore the possibilities for a common EU approach on enforcement jurisdiction in cyberspace in situations where existing frameworks are not sufficient, for example in situations where relevant e-evidence moves between jurisdictions in short fractions of time'. 34 The Commission was specially requested to determine 'which are the factors that will provide solid grounds for enforcement the jurisdiction in cyberspace and which investigative measures can be used in implementation regardless of physical borders'. 35 Similar concerns were expressed especially in relation to the MLAT process and its reform by the US Department of Justice set up in the document 'Cross-Border Law Enforcement Demands: The analysis of the US Department of Justicès Proposed Bill' issued on August 2016. The answer to these requests came on 17 April 2018 in the form of two documents: the Proposal for a Directive that specify the rules for appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings (European Commission 2018) 36 Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters' (the Regulation in the text that follows). The Council of Europe reached the agreement about the proposed document on December by adding some amendments that are expected to be adopted. However, the main objective of the Regulation was not changed. The objective of the proposal is to set an EU legal framework for investigative measures addressed to a service provider by enabling the law authorities to request ('production request') or order ('production order') from a service provider in another Member State to disclose information about a suspect user by introducing new tools and specifications of the type of the evidence sought. The core new element of the proposal allows European law enforcement authorities to directly request the disclosure and preservation of electronic data from the service providers. Appointment of representative within the service provider organization for direct communication with the requesting authority is the second new element of the Regulation. The request is applicable irrespective of the location of the provider's headquarters or the actual data-hosting location.
The proposal targets directly the specific problem created by the volatile nature of the electronic evidence and its international dimension. The cooperation mechanisms are adapted to the new digital age, providing judiciary and law enforcement tools for addressing the way criminals communicate today, and to counter modern forms of criminality. The mechanisms for fundamental human rights protection are also required to be considered in applications of the instruments provided in the Regulation for provision of transparency and accountability. The instruments are designed in a way that enables coexistence with the current judicial cooperation instruments, e.g. the CCC and EIO and not replacing them. 37 They are not intended to replace the EIO for obtaining e-evidence but they represent additional tools for the authorities allowing them much more freedom and efficiency in the search for e-evidence. The Regulation is a document organized in five chapters and 25 sub-chapters. It was prepared after consultation with relevant stakeholders that lasted for over a year and a half through surveys, ranging from open public consultations to targeted surveys with relevant public authorities.
Basic instruments and mechanisms
The two main instruments specified in the Regulation can be used for requesting evidence from providers of electronic communication services, social networks, cloud computing services, online marketplaces, other hosting service providers and providers of internet infrastructure such as IP address and domain name registries, or on their legal representatives where they exist. The orders may refer to the specific known or unknown perpetrators of a criminal offence that has already taken place as the preservation order allows only preserving data that is already stored at the time of receipt of the order and not access to data at a future point in time after the receipt of the order. The same applies to data collected by interception.
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Commission document (COM(2018) 225):
The new instrument will not replace the EIO for obtaining electronic evidence but provides an additional tool for authorities. Creating a new instrument for electronic evidence is a better alternative than amending the EIO Directive because of the specific challenges inherent in obtaining electronic evidence which do not affect the other investigative measures covered by the EIO Directive.
The novelty in the proposal addresses the new categorization of the e-evidence. Subscriber data, access data, transactional data and content data are understood differently and are specified as follows:
(a) In Article 2(7) and Article 2(8) of the proposal non-content data are understood as data pertaining to the identity of the subscriber and they allow the identification of a subscriber or customer to a service. Examples: subscriber's name, address, telephone number then metadata, which relates to the provision of services (excluding passwords or other authentication) and includes data relative to the connection, traffic or location of the communication. New category of data is included -'the access data'that defines the beginning and the termination of the service, e.g. the 'client access logs', which record the time and date an individual has accessed a service, the IP address from which the service was accessed or was allocated by the provider, data identifying the interface used, etc. Article 2(9) defines the data related to data that are generated or processed by information system of the service provider and are known as transaction logs, which identify products or services an individual has obtained from a provider or a third party (e.g. purchase of cloud storage space). Finally, Article 2(10) defines the content data as any stored data in digital format that differ from the data presented above, examples are: text, voice, videos, images, and sound stored in a digital format, other than subscriber or metadata. The Regulation limits the instruments to collection only of data that are necessary to achieve the main investigation objective. It therefore does not cover crime prevention or other types of proceedings or infringements and does not require providers to systematically collect or store more data than they do for business reasons or compliance with other legal requirements. (b) Another important aspect of the Regulation and the aligned documents is the specification of the services where e-evidence can be searched are recipients of the orders. They include: . Electronic communications services, both the traditional telecommunication services (e.g. voice telephony, SMS, internet access service) and Internet-based services, such as voice over IP, instant messaging and web-based email services (known as Over-the-Top communications services, 'OTTs'). These OTTs are in general not subject of the current EU electronic communications framework (i.e. Directive 2002/21/EC), 38 which in general applies only to traditional telecommunication services. . Internet infrastructure services such as IP address providers and domain name registries and registrars and associated privacy and proxy services (e.g. GoDaddy). 40 (c) The proposal specifies exactly the definition of the entity that can issue a production order for collecting e-evidence (Article 4), while the condition for issuing orders are specified in Article 5. The orders should be issued or validated by a judicial authority of a Member State only. The European production order is implemented by issuing a European production order certificate (defined in Article 8 of the Regulation). 41 The orders can be issued only if a similar measure is available for the same criminal offence in a comparable domestic situation in the issuing state. The misleading approach in the Guidance Note and CCC about the method how to look for the data in cases when the respective ordering document will not be classified as consent to extraterritorial enforcement of domestic production orders is now clearly set in the Regulation. Article 2 defines the Member States and authorities that could be involved in the procedure and the definition of the issuing authority is included in Article 4. Both articles specify that a judicial authority always needs to be involved in production of orders as either an issuing or a validating authority. Orders for producing transactional and content data, a judge or court is required. For subscriber or access data, this can be done by a prosecutor. (d) Regarding the type of e-evidence the Regulation introduces new dimensions and properties of data that are requested. Different conditions and safeguards apply for collecting data, as this depends on the sensitivity of the respective set of data that may be protected. Here, the categories of data that contain personal data and are covered by the safeguards under the EU data protection acquis are meant. The issue of human rights protection is directly addressed in Article 1(2) by a statement that clearly stresses that the Regulation shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect the fundamental rights and legal principles addressing privacy as is enshrined in Article 6 of the Treaty on the European Union. As different treatment by existing rules and different procedures to access data apply, in particular, major differences in that context are between the subscriber data on the one hand and transactional and content data on the other hand. (e) Another proposed measure within the proposal is the standardization and reduction of forms used by law enforcement, while judicial authorities could facilitate the creation of requests by law enforcement and increase the confidence of service providers when it comes to the identification of authorities and proper forms used. (f) Regarding cooperation with the US, practical measures are prepared for enhancing the judicial cooperation between public authorities in the EU and the US. The Impact assessment document 42 envisages the following procedures based on the existing mutual legal assistance: the regular technical dialogues with the US Department of Justice to continue to improve the process, speed and success rate of the MLA requests, and maintaining regular contacts between the EU Delegation to the 40 Commission (EC) (n 38).
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Templates for both certificates are provided in Annex I and II of the Regulation; they need to be translated into one of the official languages of the Member State where the addressee is located. The service provider may declare that orders will be accepted also in other official languages of the European Union. The aim of the certificates is to provide all the necessary information to be transmitted to the addressee in a standardized format, minimizing sources of error, allowing an easy identification of the data and avoiding as much as possible free text and therefore reducing translation costs.
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Commission (EC) (n 38).
US, the Commission and liaison magistrates of the Member States in the US for discussing the MLA process issues. In addition, the US Department of Justice's Proposed Bill and the Cross-Border Law Enforcement will be followed according to the proposer's request. These issues are explained in the introductory part of the Regulation with an aim to clarify the complementarity between different measures (in particular the EIO Directive, negotiations of an additional protocol to the Budapest Convention and the joint review of the EU-US MLA Agreement) regarding the timing, the baseline scenario and its developments that are likely to occur independently of the adoption of the proposed measures.
Discussion and conclusion
In a society where technology advances at a pace that legislation cannot match closely, the questions regarding the lawful collection of electronic evidence arise each time the digital technology make a new step and the dynamic of the society change. Our study and the survey results presented have shown that the existing legal frameworks at the international and, national level are still rooted in a reality that existed some 20 years ago with the pioneering days of internet. The increase in the relevance of electronic (communication) services for the functioning of our current and future interconnected was not followed by the same pace of development as the digital technology and this delay contributed the criminal investigations methods that mainly have remained centered around paradigms to become obsolete. The development of the technology and the means of communication and the progress in the fundamental human rights protection requested reforms in the understanding of the digital data and their categorization in line with the digital development. In this paper, we have provided insight in the current regulations and legal forms addressing criminal investigation and collection of cross-border electronic evidence. In view of the existing official documents, the opinions of the legal practitioners involved in criminal investigation, the procedures for electronic evidence collection were presented and analysed. The expressed needs for improvement of the current legal system addressing criminal investigation seems to be realized in the field of electronic data gathering with the proposed Regulation for production and preservation order. The proposed Regulation provides new instruments that help the barriers for efficient cross-border electronic evidence collection to be removed as it is designed to be directly applicable based on the clarity in the categorization of data and service providers definitions thus enabling greater legal certainty enabling the divergent data interpretations present among the EU Member state legal systems to be avoided. It is expected as well that the new instruments of the proposed Regulation to have positive impact on fragmented legal frameworks in Member States leading towards reducing the fragmentation, which was identified as a major challenge by the service providers seeking to comply with requests based on different national laws. The new approach in seeking e-evidence will increase the expediency of judicial cooperation and shorten the time for evidence collecting, which is crucial in many cases. Additional measure in that context is the proposed creation of a single point of entry on the service provider side that could also improve the direct cooperation between the issuing authorities and service providers, for example by helping them with clarification of the provider's policies. Given the diversity of legal approaches in the Member States, the number of policy areas concerned (security, fundamental rights including procedural rights and protection of personal data, economic issues), and the large range of stakeholders, the proposed Regulation promises to provide the most appropriate mechanisms so far by addressing identified problems. It should be noted as well that the mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions that have been encountered in the pass as necessary will be minimized. However, not everything is perfect and not all problems are solved and barriers removed. For example, it is still not clear how the national legislation will put in place the requested provisions on pecuniary sanctions applicable to service providers in the event of infringements of their duties. The proposed Regulation does not clarify who shall impose a sanction and who should enforce it. The proposal remedies in the procedures mainly address the service providers in cases of conflicts of law, as are the situations in which service provider can find itself in a situation where the order obliges it to provide information although the applicable law of the third country prohibits it. However, this type of remedy shall be exercised before a court in the issuing state and must offer the possibility to challenge the legality of the measure. However, the remedies concerning all other person involved are to be provided by the national law and are missing from the proposal.
Nevertheless, Regulation certainly is an act that offers solutions for cooperation and harmonization procedures to be set. It could be concluded that the practical instruments, mechanism and policy measures as presented in the Impact assessment document provide sufficient details about the procedures that will remove most barriers in criminal justice investigation within the current interconnected world.
